The Lagos-Calabar Coastal Highway is revealing the gap between ambitious announcements and engineering, procurement, and fiscal realities.
In August 2026, former Cross River Governor and PRP figure Donald Duke stated on Arise TV that Nigeria could not afford the roughly 700 km project, that terrain (especially Bayelsa swamps) made a true coastal alignment from Lagos to Calabar extremely difficult and bridge-heavy, that it was unlikely to go much beyond Epe, and that scarce resources would be better directed at power, healthcare, and fixing existing roads.
He also noted significant land reclamation along early sections. The response from APC-aligned voices and Works Minister David Umahi was sharp: the project had already advanced beyond Epe, work was underway in Ogun, Ondo, Akwa Ibom (including a long stretch), and Cross River, critics were motivated by envy, and delivery was on track under the Renewed Hope agenda.
Recent statements by Umahi 7–11 October 2026 show substantial realignments. He has defended diverting a roughly 40 km section in Ondo (parts of Sections 4A and 4B) because of deep pits (reported over 100 metres in places), unsuitable material, and far higher costs on the original line; filling work is advanced.
More broadly, a pure new coastal alignment into Edo is being abandoned in favour of linking to the existing East-West Road around the Ondo-Edo axis.
Tinubu approved this; sections of the East-West Road are to be raised by about two metres for flooding and climate resilience. Umahi has called it a sound engineering decision.
Section 1 (about 47.5 km from Ahmadu Bello Way/Victoria Island to Eleko) is reported complete and awaiting commissioning, with other sections progressing at varying rates and some targeting nearer-term milestones.
These are not minor field adjustments. They align with concerns Duke and others raised about feasibility and cost on difficult coastal/Niger Delta terrain.
Ondo Ilaje communities, lawyers, and groups including Afenifere have petitioned and protested exclusion of coastal settlements, arguing the route has shifted inland and that the project is no longer fully “coastal.” Umahi has acknowledged petitions and framed the changes as necessary rather than arbitrary.
Procurement, cost, and planning questions
The project used special/restrictive procurement for key sections, awarded primarily to Hitech Construction (linked to Gilbert Chagoury). Umahi has repeatedly stated that Tinubu did not direct the award, that he takes responsibility, that Hitech was selected for demonstrated capacity on coastal erosion and concrete paving (prior Lagos work), and that the process complied with the Procurement Act via restrictive or selective tendering, BPP review, and “No Objection” where applicable.
Later sections involved broader bidding. Financing is structured as EPC+F (Engineering, Procurement, Construction + Financing): roughly 30% federal government and 70% external loans. A Deutsche Bank-led syndicated facility of about $747 million covered Phase 1 Section 1 and was oversubscribed.
Umahi has cited costs in the region of ₦4 billion per kilometre (yielding an order-of-magnitude total near ₦2.8 trillion for 700 km under certain assumptions), while critics have cited higher figures and unfavourable comparisons with other African coastal or highway projects.
According to Umahi, the lenders conducted due diligence on environmental, resettlement, and cost aspects. The project is intended to be repaid partly through tolls and corridor commercial development.
Budget visibility has been imperfect at times; the minister has addressed omissions or reclassifications in appropriations.
Critics (including Atiku Abubakar earlier, Babachir Lawal, and others) have called it a white-elephant or poorly planned project: limited open competitive bidding from the outset, high unit costs relative to terrain claims, mid-course redesigns that suggest incomplete initial studies, prioritisation amid debt and service shortfalls, and perceptions of political or personal links. Compensation and community issues have also surfaced in places.
Questions many Nigerians are asking
– If deep peat, pits exceeding 100 metres, flooding risks, and material shortages made large original alignments impractical or dramatically more expensive, what did the pre-construction feasibility studies, soil investigations, and detailed designs actually conclude?
How thorough was the initial planning versus political announcement?
– Even if restrictive or selective procurement is lawful under the Procurement Act and BPP processes were followed, why was open competitive bidding not the default for a multi-trillion-naira flagship project?
How fully was any potential conflict of interest (given known relationships) disclosed and managed?
– What is the complete, current, publicly verifiable total cost (including all sections, elevations, bridges, contingencies, and financing charges)?
How much additional sovereign or guaranteed debt is involved, on what terms, and what is the realistic repayment path via tolls and land development versus residual fiscal burden?
– Why do Ilaje and other coastal communities allege systematic exclusion and claim the diverted route is longer or more expensive?
Is the finished corridor still meaningfully coastal across its length, or has it become a hybrid that serves different economic or political interests?
– Relative to Nigeria’s existing road decay, power deficits, healthcare underfunding, and security constraints on long-distance travel, is this the highest-return use of scarce resources, or does “legacy project” branding risk displacing more basic priorities?
– When early technical and fiscal scepticism is met primarily with volume and personal attacks rather than full data dumps, and then major design changes occur, does that build or erode confidence in claims of competence and transparency?
Adaptive engineering is normal on difficult terrain; visible progress on completed sections is a fact. External financing with lender due as claimed diligence provides one layer of scrutiny.
However, the combination of restricted initial procurement, evolving alignments that confirm earlier feasibility doubts, community grievances, and incomplete public cost transparency sustains the view—held by many—that the project has elements of an under-planned “elephant” exercise whose political presentation has outrun its technical and fiscal grounding.
For an administration that has made this a signature item, releasing the original studies, full contract and cost breakdowns, change-order justifications, and independent verification would address more doubts than online mobilisation alone.
Reality has already complicated the simpler narrative.
Pamela O.
Daily Buzzwire.
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